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A  NEW  THIRD-PARTY  DOCTRINE:  THE
TELEPHONE  METADATA  PROGRAM  AND
CARPENTER  V.  UNITED  STATES
Mary-Kathryn Takeuchi*
INTRODUCTION
The third-party doctrine was long considered a well-established principle
that was not going anywhere anytime soon.  It traces back to early Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence in 1967, when the Supreme Court issued its
landmark decision in Katz v. United States.1  There, the Court asserted that
“[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection.”2  The Court affirmed this assertion in
United States v. Miller, holding that checks and other financial records volun-
tarily turned over to a bank were not subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion,3 and again in Smith v. Maryland, holding that phone numbers dialed
out were voluntarily conveyed to a phone company and therefore not enti-
tled to Fourth Amendment protection.4  What resulted was a bright-line rule
that guided courts in deciding cases under the third-party doctrine: an indi-
vidual has no reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amend-
ment in information that is voluntarily conveyed to a third party.5
* Mary-Kathryn (“Katie”) Takeuchi, Juris Doctor Candidate, Notre Dame Law School,
2020; Bachelor of Arts in Economics, The George Washington University, 2016.  I express
my most sincere thanks to Professor Jimmy Gurule´ for providing valuable guidance that
has been integral not only to the writing of this Note, but to my entire law school career.  I
would also like to thank the members of the Notre Dame Law Review for their thorough
editing and constant encouragement.  All errors are my own.
1 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (explaining the holding to be that
the Fourth Amendment protects that in which “a person has a . . . reasonable expectation
of privacy”).
2 Id. at 351 (majority opinion).
3 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
4 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744 (1979).
5 See id. at 742 (“[The court] doubt[ed] that people in general entertain any actual
expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial . . . realiz[ing] that they must ‘convey’
phone numbers to the telephone company.”); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442 (explaining that
there is “no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in . . . information voluntarily conveyed to
the banks and exposed to their employees”); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (“What a person
knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth
Amendment protection.”).
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In 2018, the Supreme Court confronted and reconsidered the forty-year-
old third-party doctrine in the newest Fourth Amendment landmark case,
Carpenter v. United States.6  The digital world—a world in which technology
and mobile devices are extensions of our own bodies, tracking our every con-
versation, every move, every purchase, every internet search—was becoming
one in which the bright-line rule of voluntary disclosure could no longer
thrive.  Would the Court allow these tiny 5.8-inch devices that captivate Amer-
icans’ entire lives in sixty-four gigabits to reveal such personal information to
the government without a warrant?  Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, recognized these concerns and made a substantial retreat from the
traditional bright-line approach of the third-party doctrine.7  What came
from the Carpenter decision was a new balancing test that weighs the reduced
or reasonable expectation of privacy against whether the information was
truly voluntarily exposed to the third party.8
Roberts asserted that the Court’s decision in Carpenter should have no
bearing on national security law.9  By making that simple assertion, however,
he raised the red flag and called attention to the question of how the third-
party doctrine applies to the collection of information relating to national
security.  Perhaps the most significant question is how the third-party doc-
trine applies to bulk metadata collection under the Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act’s telephone metadata program.  Under the United and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Inter-
cept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, the government could collect and record
any tangible thing, most significantly, bulk telephone metadata on millions
of Americans without a warrant.10  In an infamous 2013 leak to the press, the
American public discovered that the government had collected and recorded
bulk metadata on millions of wireless subscribers.11  Congress attempted to
remedy the situation by enacting new legislation.  However, the impact of the
new law remains unclear, with millions of datapoints still being collected and
recorded, which has long been defended by the fact that individuals turn
over revealing information to their wireless providers, thereby barring them
from bringing any Fourth Amendment claim against the government.12
This Note will answer the question of whether bulk metadata collection
is still defensible under the third-party doctrine.  It ultimately concludes that
6 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
7 See id. at 2220 (holding that the third-party doctrine did not apply to CSLI data).
8 See id. at 2219–20 (applying the balancing test); see also id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (“The Court appears, in my respectful view, to read Miller and Smith to estab-
lish a balancing test.  For each ‘qualitatively different category’ of information, the Court
suggests, the privacy interests at stake must be weighed against the fact that the informa-
tion has been disclosed to a third party.”).
9 Id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (“[O]ur opinion does not consider other collection
techniques involving foreign affairs or national security.”).
10 See infra notes 100–01 and accompanying text.
11 See infra notes 102–03 and accompanying text.
12 See infra Part II (describing in depth the issues surrounding bulk metadata
collection).
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Roberts incorrectly asserted that Carpenter will not impact the application of
the third-party doctrine to collection techniques involving national security,
and that the warrantless collection of bulk metadata under the Foreign Intel-
ligence Surveillance Act is no longer defensible by the third-party doctrine.
In Section I.A, this Note discusses traditional Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence in Katz v. United States and the establishment of the third-party doc-
trine as a bright-line rule in United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland.  This
Note also provides background on the Court’s hint at a coming change in
the third-party doctrine in United States v. Jones.13  In Section I.B, this Note
explains the Court’s decision in Carpenter v. United States before laying out the
new balancing test in Section I.C.  In Part II, this Note describes the issue at
hand by discussing the controversy surrounding bulk metadata collection
under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act’s telephone metadata pro-
gram, as well as the open question remaining of whether the government’s
collection under that program is defensible by the third-party doctrine.  In
Part III, this Note applies Carpenter’s new balancing test to the telephone
metadata program and determines that, because individuals have a reasona-
ble expectation of privacy in the metadata collected by the government
under the telephone metadata program, and that because there is no volun-
tary exposure, the privacy interests at stake clearly outweigh the mere fact
that information has been disclosed to wireless carriers.  As such, the Note
concludes that the telephone metadata program constitutes Fourth Amend-
ment activity because the third-party doctrine no longer protects the govern-
ment from defending warrantless searches.  Section III.D also briefly
discusses the implications of the findings under the new balancing test and
suggests how courts will further evaluate the constitutionality of bulk
metadata collection.
I. BACKGROUND
In order to understand the substantial retreat from the third-party doc-
trine that the Supreme Court made in Carpenter v. United States, this Note
begins by reviewing the origins of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Sec-
tion I.A provides a summary of Katz v. United States and then explains the
establishment of the third-party doctrine in United States v. Miller and Smith v.
Maryland, which was later questioned in Jones v. United States.  This Part then
proceeds to describe the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter and the
resulting emergence of a new balancing test.
13 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
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A. The History of the Fourth Amendment and the Third-Party Doctrine
1. Katz v. United States: A Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
The Fourth Amendment protects the principle that “a person has a . . .
reasonable expectation of privacy.”14  Modern Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence can be traced back to these words in the Supreme Court’s decision in
Katz, where it rejected the idea that something might be a “constitutionally
protected area,” and rather asserted that “the Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places.”15  In that case, the government overheard Katz’s conver-
sation from outside of a public telephone booth and used the content of that
conversation as evidence against him in a criminal proceeding.16  The Court
held that Katz had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his conversation,
and that “[t]he [g]overnment’s activities in electronically listening to and
recording [Katz’s] words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied
while using the telephone booth.”17  As such, the Court held that the govern-
ment’s activities in Katz constituted a Fourth Amendment search and
seizure.18  However, the Court also determined that “[w]hat a person know-
ingly exposes to the public . . . is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion.”19  This foreshadowed what would soon become known as the third-
party doctrine.
2. United States v. Miller and Smith v. Maryland: Establishing the Third-
Party Doctrine
Almost a decade after the Katz decision, in United States v. Miller,20 Mitch
Miller was convicted of operating an undocumented whiskey distillery in
14 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (agreeing
with the Court’s holding in this aspect).
15 See id. at 350–51 (majority opinion) (noting that the Court “decline[s] to adopt this
formulation of the issues”).
16 See id. at 348 (describing the government’s attempt “to introduce evidence of
[Katz’s] end” of the conversation “overheard by FBI agents who had attached” a listening
device to the phone booth).
17 Id. at 353.
18 Id. (“The Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the
petitioner’s words violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the
telephone booth and thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”).  This Note will refer to Fourth Amendment searches and seizures
as “Fourth Amendment activity.”  After determining that Katz had a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy, the Court conducted the second part of its Fourth Amendment two-step
test, addressing “whether the search and seizure conducted in this case complied with con-
stitutional standards.” See id. at 354–59.  This Note focuses only on what is considered
Fourth Amendment activity, so only the first part of the Court’s Fourth Amendment two-
step test is relevant to the Note’s analysis.
19 Id. at 351.
20 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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Kathleen, Georgia.21  While investigating the case, the government obtained
copies of checks and other financial records without a warrant.22  Miller
alleged that this constituted unlawful Fourth Amendment activity, but the
Court determined that Miller had no protectable Fourth Amendment inter-
est in the checks and financial records.23  The Court relied on Katz in find-
ing that there was “no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy,’” as Miller had
voluntarily conveyed the information to the banks and their employees—a
third party.24  The Court in Miller drew a bright-line rule for the third-party
doctrine: when information is voluntarily conveyed to a third party, there is
no legitimate expectation of privacy and, therefore, no Fourth Amendment
interest in the information.  Therefore, there is no Fourth Amendment activ-
ity, and the individual lacks standing.  The Court’s determination was a
bright-line rule as it made its decision without inquiry into how voluntary the
conveyance of information was, or if there still remained any legitimate, or
reasonable, expectation of privacy in the information.
The Court affirmed its reasoning in Miller and the bright-line rule of the
third-party doctrine in Smith v. Maryland.25  In that case, a robbery victim
called the police, reporting that the man identifying himself as the robber
had repeatedly made threatening phone calls to the victim following the rob-
bery.26  During one of the phone calls, the man told the victim to step
outside.  In doing so, the victim saw the man driving slowly past her home.27
Using the information provided by the victim, the government was able to
trace the license plate number on the car to Michael Smith.28  The govern-
ment, without a warrant, directed Smith’s telephone company to install a pen
register that would record the numbers dialed from his home.29  The pen
register revealed that Smith was calling the victim, and using this informa-
tion, the government then secured a warrant that revealed evidence support-
ing a charge and conviction for robbery.30  Smith argued that the installation
and use of the pen register violated his Fourth Amendment rights.31  The
21 Id. at 437 (describing the facts of the case where the sheriffs discovered the illegal
distilleries after a fire broke out at the warehouse that Miller rented).
22 Id. at 436 (explaining that the government obtained records “by means of . . . sub-
poenas duces tecum served upon two banks at which [Miller] had accounts.”).
23 Id. at 440 (finding that “there was no intrusion into any area in which [Miller] had a
protected Fourth Amendment interest”).
24 Id. at 442 (“[W]e perceive no legitimate ‘expectation of privacy’ in their con-
tents. . . . All of the documents obtained, including financial statements and deposit slips,
contain only information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employ-
ees in the ordinary course of business.”).
25 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
26 Id. at 737.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. at 742 (“Given a pen register’s limited capabilities, . . . petitioner’s argument that
its installation and use constituted a ‘search’ necessarily rests upon a claim that he had a
‘legitimate expectation of privacy’ regarding the numbers he dialed on his phone.”).
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Court rejected Smith’s claim.32  The Court held that, under the third-party
doctrine, Smith had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he volun-
tarily conveyed the phone numbers he dialed to his phone company, which
the Court considered a third party.33  Relying on Miller, the Court employed
an assumption of the risk reasoning to support the bright-line rule in the
third-party doctrine.34
3. United States v. Jones: Questioning the Third-Party Doctrine
The Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in United States v. Jones35 led to the
questioning of the viability of the third-party doctrine in the modern world.
After Antoine Jones came under suspicion of trafficking narcotics, the gov-
ernment installed a GPS-tracking device on his vehicle while it was publicly
parked.36  For the following four weeks, the government tracked the vehicle’s
movements, which revealed more than two thousand pages of data.37  This
data supported an indictment to charge Jones with conspiracy to distribute
and possess with intent to distribute cocaine.38  The district court allowed the
admission of this evidence, holding that “[a] person traveling in an automo-
bile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another.”39  This reasoning follows from the
third-party doctrine and the idea that an individual automatically has no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in information shared, even if not directly
shared with a third party but rather shared through the use of public roads.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court’s decision, holding that the
government’s actions constituted Fourth Amendment activity and violated
the Fourth Amendment.40  The Supreme Court affirmed.41  The Court
pointed to the pervasiveness of the four-week-long tracking, noting that such
“longer term” GPS tracking implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.42
32 Id.
33 Id. (“[W]e doubt that people in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy
in the numbers they dial.  All telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ phone num-
bers to the telephone company, since it is through the telephone company switching
equipment that their calls are completed.  All subscribers realize, moreover, that the
phone company has facilities for making permanent records of the numbers they dial, for
they see a list of their long-distance (toll) calls on their monthly bills.”).
34 Id. at 744 (“Because the depositor ‘assumed the risk’ of disclosure, the Court held
that it would be unreasonable for him to expect his financial records to remain private.”).
35 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
36 See id. at 402–03.
37 Id. at 403.
38 Id.
39 United States v. Jones, 451 F. Supp. 2d 71, 88 (D.D.C. 2006) (quoting United States
v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983)).
40 See Jones, 565 U.S. at 404.
41 Id. at 413.
42 See id. at 412.
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The Court also noted that by attaching the GPS-tracking device to a private
area—the vehicle—the government “encroached on a protected area.”43
In her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor, recognizing that much of the
government’s argument stemmed from the third-party doctrine (although it
was in no way a perfect application), suggested that “it may be necessary to
reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.”44  Sotomayor
noted that the third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age,” pointing to
modern use of technology and the amount of information individuals store
on mobile devices simply in “the course of carrying out mundane tasks.”45
She rejected the assumption that “all information voluntarily disclosed to
some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone,
disentitled to Fourth Amendment protection.”46  Sotomayor’s refusal to
accept that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in infor-
mation simply because of the mere fact that she shared it with a third party
set the stage for the Court’s decision in Carpenter six years later.
B. Carpenter v. United States
In 2011, four men were arrested for robbing Radio Shack and T-Mobile
stores.47  One of the suspects identified fifteen accomplices and provided
their cell phone numbers to the government.48  The prosecutors used this
information to obtain cell phone records from wireless carriers for several
other suspects, including Timothy Carpenter.49  The cell-site location infor-
mation (CSLI) data provided the government with 12,898 location points for
Carpenter alone.50  This information supported a charge of six counts of rob-
bery and six counts of carrying a firearm during a federal crime of violence.51
Carpenter filed a motion to suppress the CSLI data provided by the wireless
carriers, arguing that the government’s warrantless seizure of the CSLI data
was an unlawful Fourth Amendment search unsupported by probable
43 Id. at 410.
44 Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
45 Id. (“People disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to their cellular prov-
iders; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their
Internet service providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they purchase to
online retailers.”).
46 Id. at 418.
47 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2212 (2018).
48 Id.
49 Id.  The prosecutors were able to obtain such information by applying for a court
order under the Stored Communications Act, which “permits the Government to compel
the disclosure of certain telecommunications records when it ‘offers specific and articul-
able facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe’ that the records sought
‘are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.’” Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d) (2012)).
50 Id. For a description of how CSLI data works, see id. at 2211.
51 Id. at 2212.
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cause.52  The trial court denied Carpenter’s motion.53  At trial, the informa-
tion placed Carpenter at four of the robberies.54  This supported multiple
convictions and a sentence of over 100 years in prison.55  The Sixth Circuit
affirmed the trial court’s decision based on its well-founded understanding of
the third-party doctrine.56  The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari.57
The Court determined that the government violated Carpenter’s Fourth
Amendment rights when it accessed CSLI data from his wireless carriers, and
held that the third-party doctrine did not apply to the facts in Carpenter.58
Carpenter is a substantial retreat from the Court’s historical application of the
third-party doctrine, in that the Court now qualifies and considers the level
of (1) the individual’s expectation of privacy and (2) the individual’s volun-
tary exposure.59  Thus, a new balancing test emerged from this decision,
though the majority never called it such.  Rather Justice Kennedy, in dissent,
understood the Court’s reasoning to be a balancing test, which requires that
“the privacy interests at stake must be weighed against the fact that the infor-
mation has been disclosed to a third party.”60  Justice Kennedy further noted
that only “[w]hen the privacy interests are weighty enough to ‘overcome’ the
third-party disclosure, [will] the Fourth Amendment’s protections apply.”61
This significantly departs from previous Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
which treated the third-party doctrine as a bright-line rule.62
52 Id.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 2212–13.  “In the Government’s view, the location records clinched the
case . . . .” Id. at 2213.
55 Id. (“Carpenter was convicted on all but one of the firearm counts and sentenced to
more than 100 years in prison.”).
56 See id. (“The court held that Carpenter lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the location information collected by the FBI because he had shared that information
with his wireless carriers.  Given that cell phone users voluntarily convey cell-cite data to
their carriers as ‘a means of establishing communication,’ the court concluded that the
resulting business records are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.” (quoting
Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979))).
57 Id.
58 See id. at 2220 (“[The Court] decline[s] to extend Smith and Miller to the collection
of CSLI” because “the fact that the Government obtained the information from a third
party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
59 See id. at 2219–20 (discussing in depth the two rationales underlying the third-party
doctrine: a reduced expectation of privacy and voluntary exposure).
60 Id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2232.
62 The bright-line rule comes from Miller and Smith and articulates that an individual
does not automatically have a reasonable expectation of privacy in that which she shares
with a third party. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742 (1979) (doubting that “people
in general entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they dial . . .
realiz[ing] that they must ‘convey’ phone numbers to the telephone company”); United
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976) (ruling that there is “no legitimate ‘expectation of
privacy’ in . . . information voluntarily conveyed to the banks and exposed to their employ-
ees”); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (“What a person knowingly
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C. Carpenter’s New Balancing Test
1. Factor One: A Reasonable or Reduced Expectation of Privacy
The first factor in determining applicability of the third-party doctrine is
whether there is a “reasonable” or “reduced” expectation of privacy.63  In
making such determination of privacy interests in Carpenter, the Court con-
sidered “‘the nature of the particular documents sought’ to determine
whether ‘there is a legitimate64 “expectation of privacy” concerning their
contents.’”65  This is a substantial retreat from the notion “that a person has
no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over
to third parties.”66  Instead, an individual’s expectation of privacy is placed
on a spectrum and falls either into a realm of reasonable or reduced.
The Court took two steps in determining whether there is a reasonable
or reduced expectation of privacy.  First, in considering the nature of the
documents, the Court looked at limitations on the information available.  In
doing so, the Court distinguished the facts of Carpenter from those of Smith,
noting that the capabilities of a pen register are limited.67  Telephone call
logs do not reveal content that might be considered “identifying informa-
tion.”68  However, the Court acknowledged that there are no such limitations
on the CSLI data in Carpenter.69  The time-stamped CSLI data provides
insight to the intimate details of an individual’s life including one’s location,
but also going so far as to reveal “familial, political, professional, religious,
and sexual associations.”70  Furthermore, it cannot even be said that there is
a limitation on whose information is collected, as the CSLI data continuously
logs information for the 400 million cell phone devices belonging to every-
one in the United States, rather than just those individuals under
investigation.71
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amend-
ment protection.”).
63 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (“The third-party doctrine partly stems from the notion
that an individual has a reduced expectation of privacy in information knowingly shared
with another.”).
64 In Carpenter, the Court apparently equates “legitimate” to “reasonable.”  The Court
has also used the word “actual” in its previous decisions when discussing the expectation of
privacy.  I read all three to have the same meaning, and I employ the use of the word
“reasonable” in this Note.
65 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (quoting Miller, 425 U.S. at 442).
66 Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–44.
67 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219 (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 742).
68 Id. (quoting Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 400 (2014)).
69 See id. at 2219 (discussing the government’s failure to recognize that there are no
comparable limitations).
70 Id. at 2217 (quoting Riley, 573 U.S. at 396).
71 Id. at 2218 (“Critically, because location information is continually logged for all of
the 400 million devices in the United States—not just those belonging to persons who
might happen to come under investigation—this newfound tracking capacity runs against
everyone.”).
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Second, in determining whether there is a reasonable or reduced expec-
tation of privacy in such documents, the Court examined the pervasiveness of
the government’s actions.72  In Carpenter, the Court placed special emphasis
on the retrospective pervasiveness of CSLI data.  There, the Court explained
that the “detailed chronicle” of a person’s every movement “compiled every
day, every moment, over several years” was so pervasive as to implicate a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy.73  Furthermore, the retrospective pervasive-
ness of the “historical cell-site records,”74 along with the societal norm that
individuals “compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time,”75 led the
Court to analogize the level of surveillance made possible by a cell phone to
that of an ankle monitor.76  The Court recognized that this allows the gov-
ernment to “travel back in time to retrace a person’s whereabouts, subject only
to the retention policies of the wireless carriers, which currently maintain
records for up to five years.”77  The Court considered the CSLI to provide the
wireless carriers with an infallible memory.78  The Court placed a similar
emphasis on pervasiveness in Jones, where it stated that the “longer term”
GPS tracking of a vehicle implicated a reasonable expectation of privacy.79
Because CSLI data has a “unique nature” that implicates privacy concerns
similar to—or even beyond—those in Jones, the Court held that an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the record of his physical move-
ments captured by CSLI data.80
2. Factor Two: Voluntary Exposure
The second factor at hand involves finding out whether there was a vol-
untary exposure of the information to a third party.81  Again, the Court took
two steps to determine whether there was voluntary exposure.  First, the
72 See id. at 2220.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 2218 (emphasis added).
75 Id.
76 See id. (“Accordingly, when the Government tracks the location of a cell phone it
achieves near perfect surveillance, as if it had attached an ankle monitor to the phone’s
user.”).
77 Id. (emphasis added).
78 Id. at 2219 (“[The wireless carriers] are not your typical witnesses.  Unlike the nosy
neighbor who keeps an eye on comings and goings, they are ever alert, and their memory
is nearly infallible.”).
79 Id. at 2220 (citing United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concur-
ring in the judgment)) (“But when confronted with more pervasive tracking, five Justices
agreed that longer term GPS monitoring of even a vehicle traveling on public streets con-
stitutes [Fourth Amendment activity].”).  The Court also noted that the tracking of CSLI
data is even more pervasive than the tracking of a vehicle. Id. at 2218 (“While individuals
regularly leave their vehicles, they compulsively carry cell phones with them all the time.”).
80 Id. at 2217 (“[A]n individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI [data].”).
81 See id. at 2220 (discussing “the second rationale underlying the third-party doc-
trine—voluntary exposure”).
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information must truly be shared.82  Second, there must be some affirmative
act that allowed the individual to opt into sharing the information.83  This is
a substantial retreat from the Court’s previous and consistent holding “that a
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties.”84  Instead, the Court adopted the stance taken
from the dissent in Smith, which would require that an individual actively
make the choice to share the information in order to trigger the third-party
doctrine.85
In the first step, the Court looks at whether the individual has a choice
in the recording of the information.  If there is no choice, then the Court is
reluctant to find that the information is truly shared.  In Carpenter, the Court
noted that cell phones are “indispensable to participation in modern soci-
ety.”86  As such, almost everyone in the United States owns one, and the
Court points out that “[o]nly the few without cell phones could escape this
tireless and absolute surveillance.”87  With cell phones being considered such
a necessity to individuals in the United States, the Court concluded that CSLI
data conveyed to wireless carriers through them “is not truly ‘shared’ as one
normally understands the term.”88
In the second step, the Court considered assumption of the risk through
some affirmative act made by the individual.89  In Carpenter, the Court did
not find that Carpenter had assumed any risk because the recording of CSLI
data is triggered through “[v]irtually any activity on the phone.”90  Short of
disconnecting from the network, the Court reasoned that an individual has
“no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data.”91  Therefore, the
Court determined that Carpenter did not assume of the risk of turning over a
“comprehensive dossier of his physical movements” simply through operat-
ing a cell phone.92  Without anything further, the Court appears unlikely to
find voluntary exposure.
82 See id.
83 See id.
84 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
85 See id. at 749 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“Implicit in the concept of assumption of
risk is some notion of choice.”).
86 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
87 Id. at 2218.
88 Id. at 2220.
89 See id. (“Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without
any affirmative act on the part of the user . . . .”).  Such “affirmative act” is likely what
Justice Marshall would consider to be a “choice” in his dissent in Smith.  It is significant that
this differs from how Justice Blackmun discussed assumption of the risk in Smith. See supra
notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
90 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
91 Id.
92 Id.
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3. Balancing the Factors
Finally, the Court weighed “the privacy interests at stake . . . against the
fact that the information ha[d] been disclosed to a third party.”93  It con-
cluded that the mere fact that the government was able to collect the infor-
mation from the wireless carrier—a third party—was insufficient to
overcome the reasonable expectation of privacy in the CLSI data.94  The bal-
ancing test in Carpenter was simple: there was no truly voluntary exposure of
the CSLI data to outweigh Carpenter’s reasonable expectation of privacy in
the information.95  As such, the Court concluded that the government’s col-
lection constituted a Fourth Amendment search.96
II. THE ISSUE
In this Part, this Note looks in depth at the issue of the government’s
bulk metadata collection.  It begins with a summary of the telephone
metadata program under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and the
controversial leak to the public about the government’s collection.  It then
discusses the failed Fourth Amendment challenge brought before the
Supreme Court, the legislation enacted in an attempt to mitigate privacy con-
cerns, and the remaining conclusion that the bright-line rule guiding the
third-party doctrine controls cases regarding the telephone metadata pro-
gram’s constitutionality.
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 197897 (“FISA”) established
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), which reviews govern-
ment requests for orders allowing electronic surveillance.98  FISA allowed the
government to obtain orders from the FISC that would allow the government
to collect business records, so long as there were “specific and articulable
facts” indicating that the business records related to foreign intelligence and
international terrorism investigations.99  Following the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, Congress passed the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act (“PATRIOT Act”).100  Section 215 of the PATRIOT Act
93 Id. at 2231 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2220 (majority opinion) (balanc-
ing the factors).
94 Id. at 2220 (“[T]he fact that the Government obtained the information from a third
party does not overcome Carpenter’s claim to Fourth Amendment protection.”).
95 See supra subsections I.C.1–.2.
96 See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220 (“The Government’s acquisition of the cell-site
records was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
97 Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 (1978) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1811 (2012)).
98 See GEOFFREY CORN ET AL., NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 199 (2015).
99 Id. at 211.
100 Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered titles of
the U.S. Code).
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amended FISA to allow for not just the collection of business records, but
also of “any tangible things.”101
In 2013, The Guardian published information leaked by Edward
Snowden, a 29-year-old former CIA employee, exposing the National Security
Agency’s telephone metadata program that was collecting records of millions
of Verizon subscribers in the United States.102  Relying on section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act, under the telephone metadata program, wireless carriers pro-
vided to the government originating and terminating telephone numbers, as
well as the time and duration of the calls.103  Such information was main-
tained in a database and stored for five years.104  The revelation of the tele-
phone metadata program raised privacy concerns, as the government’s
collection “would allow the NSA to build easily a comprehensive picture of
who any individual contacted, how and when, and possibly from where,
retrospectively.”105
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) responded by filing suit
against the government.106  The ACLU alleged both that section 215 does
not authorize the telephone metadata program, and that even if it does, it
violates the Fourth Amendment.107  The Second Circuit decided that
because the telephone metadata program was not authorized by statute, it
did not need to address the constitutional issue.108  However, the court of
appeals noted that the Fourth Amendment issue was “potentially vexing.”109
The government contended that the telephone metadata program did not
constitute Fourth Amendment activity under the third-party doctrine.110
101 Id. § 215, 115 Stat. at 287–88.  The PATRIOT Act allows the government to “make
an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible thing[ ] . . . for an
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activi-
ties.” Id.
102 Glenn Greenwald, NSA Collecting Phone Records of Millions of Verizon Customers Daily,
GUARDIAN (June 6, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-
records-verizon-court-order; see also Glenn Greenwald et al., Edward Snowden: The
Whistleblower Behind the NSA Surveillance Revelations, GUARDIAN (June 11, 2013), https://
www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/09/edward-snowden-nsa-whistleblower-surveil-
lance (revealing Edward Snowden as the individual who leaked the information).
103 See CORN ET AL., supra note 98, at 212–13 (explaining the telephone metadata
program).
104 Id. at 212.
105 Greenwald, supra note 102.
106 ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 2015).
107 See id. at 821 (introducing the constitutional claim as an alternative argument).
108 See id. at 824 (“Because we conclude that the challenged program was not author-
ized by the statute on which the government bases its claim of legal authority, we need not
and do not reach these weighty constitutional issues.”).
109 Id. at 821.
110 See id. at 822 (discussing the government’s argument that the third-party doctrine
requires the rejection of the appellants’ claim that the telephone metadata program “vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment, or even implicates its protections at all”).
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The ACLU argued for a revisitation of the third-party doctrine.111  While the
court offered some discussion on the matter, it never provided an answer.112
In 2015, Congress enacted the United and Strengthening America by
Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Discipline Over Monitoring Act of
2015 (“FREEDOM Act”).113  The FREEDOM Act was aimed at ending the
telephone metadata program under section 215.114  Under the FREEDOM
Act, the government can no longer directly collect and maintain the phone
records of U.S. citizens.115  Rather, the government must now seek warrants
from the FISC that will allow it to direct wireless carriers to turn over data on
their subscribers.116  However, the enactment of the FREEDOM Act has not
done away with the telephone metadata program, or any of the privacy con-
cerns that come with it.117  For example, Executive Order 12,333 could be
construed to allow for the telephone metadata program to collect and store
communications by persons from the United States without a warrant.118
Furthermore, when Larry Klayman filed an emergency petition for a rehear-
ing en banc for his case concerning the constitutionality of the telephone
metadata program, the D.C. Circuit denied his petition, and then-Judge Kav-
anaugh wrote in his concurring statement:
I vote to deny plaintiffs’ emergency petition for rehearing en banc.  I do so
because, in my view, the Government’s metadata collection program is
entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. . . . The Government’s col-
lection of telephony metadata from a third party such as a telecommunica-
111 See id. (“Appellants respond that modern technology requires revisitation of the
underpinnings of the third-party records doctrine as applied to telephone metadata.”).
112 See id. at 821–25; see also id. at 824 (“[W]e need not and do not reach these weighty
constitutional issues.”).
113 Uniting and Strengthening America by Fulfilling Rights and Ensuring Effective Dis-
cipline Over Monitoring Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12, 15, 18, and 50 U.S.C).
114 See id.  Additionally, the PATRIOT Act was set to expire when the FREEDOM Act
was enacted. See Steven Nelson, Senate Passes Freedom Act, Ending Patriot Act Provision Lapse,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 2, 2015), https://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/
06/02/senate-passes-freedom-act-ending-patriot-act-provision-lapse.
115 See Robert Hackett, No, NSA Phone Spying Has Not Ended, FORTUNE (Dec. 1, 2015),
http://fortune.com/2015/12/01/nsa-phone-bulk-collection-end/ (“Congress eventually
reacted by replacing parts of the [PATRIOT Act], which authorized the privacy-invasive
program, with a seemingly-less-intrusive piece of legislation, the [FREEDOM Act], over the
summer.”).
116 See id. (discussing the new process for obtaining telephone metadata under the
FREEDOM Act).
117 See generally id. (noting and further explaining how “[i]t would be wrong to con-
clude, however, that this moment signaled the demise of the agency’s surveillance powers”
and further asserting that “questions remain about [the FREEDOM Act’s]
implementation”).
118 Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981); see also John Napier
Tye, Opinion, Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan Rule That Lets the NSA Spy on Ameri-
cans, WASH. POST (July 18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/meet-execu-
tive-order-12333-the-reagan-rule-that-lets-the-nsa-spy-on-americans/2014/07/18/93d2ac22-
0b93-11e4-b8e5-d0de80767fc2_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.18c29fa1b489.
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tions service provider is not considered a search under the Fourth
Amendment, at least under the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Mary-
land.  That precedent remains binding on lower courts in our hierarchical
system of absolute vertical stare decisis.119
There is significant uncertainty surrounding the government’s tele-
phone metadata program stemming from the end of the PATRIOT Act to
Kavanaugh’s assertion that it remains constitutional.  Kavanaugh’s concur-
ring opinion was written after the FREEDOM Act passed.  It signaled that
bulk metadata collection still occurs, and that the government’s collection of
it could be defended by the third-party doctrine.  In fact, Kavanaugh’s state-
ment proved that the question of its constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment could not even be tested simply because the metadata is turned
over to wireless carriers.  And the resulting problem at hand is this: the NSA
has continued to collect millions of records about Americans’ phone calls
under the telephone metadata program.120  Those collected and recorded
data points far outnumber the number of warrants granted to the NSA.121
There is little transparency surrounding that matter.122  However, it is signifi-
cant that the government announced that it had not been collecting bulk
metadata in recent months, and that President Trump may not ask Congress
to renew its legal authority when it expires at the end of the year.123  Regard-
less, courts cannot answer the question of whether the telephone metadata
program is constitutional so long as Miller and Smith guide the courts in
determining that under the bright-line rule of the third-party doctrine,
because the metadata is shared with wireless carriers, the government’s col-
lection of it is not considered Fourth Amendment activity.
This is in no way a new problem.  In his dissenting opinion in Miller,
Justice Brennan expressed concern about Congress creating programs that
allow the government access to information “without invocation of the judi-
119 Klayman v. Obama, 805 F.3d 1148, 1148–49 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Kavanaugh, J., con-
curring in the denial of rehearing en banc) (citation omitted).  Judge Kavanaugh draws a
superficial comparison between the metadata program and the facts of Smith, relying
mostly on the fact that both information sets came from the use of a telephone, and ignor-
ing entirely the substantial change from the use of phones when Smith was decided in
contrast to the current way that society uses phones and mobile devices.  His assertion that
the lower court is bound by that case almost invites the Supreme Court to decide
otherwise.
120 See James Vincent, NSA Collected 151 Million Phone Records in 2016, Despite Surveillance
Law Changes, VERGE (May 3, 2017), https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/3/15527882/nsa-
collecting-phone-records-us-citizen-metadata.
121 See id.
122 See id.
123 See Charlie Savage, Disputed N.S.A. Phone Program is Shut Down, Aide Says, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/nsa-phone-records-
program-shut-down.html.  It is fair to be skeptical of the government’s assertion that it will
stop metadata collection.  Even as the article points out,  after the replacement system
under the FREEDOM Act took effect, “the scale of collection remained huge.” Id.; see also
Vincent, supra note 120.
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cial process”124—which is exactly what occurs with the telephone metadata
program.  Congress freely creates and undoes the government’s ability to
access information, while the courts are unable to address its constitutionality
so long as the courts cannot recognize it as Fourth Amendment activity.
Most significantly, dating back to Katz, Justice Douglas saw the new direction
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence as “a wholly unwarranted green light
for the Executive Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a war-
rant in cases which the Executive Branch itself labels as ‘national security’
matters,”125 seemingly foreshadowing today’s problem.
However, the Court’s new third-party balancing test in Carpenter might
just help us solve it.
III. ANALYSIS
Since the Carpenter decision, no court has answered the question of the
constitutionality of the telephone metadata program.  Prior to Carpenter,
courts ruled that the telephone metadata program was constitutional under
Miller and Smith.126  In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Carpenter,
courts would apply Carpenter’s balancing test, rather than the bright-line rule
in Miller and Smith.  The Carpenter balancing test makes a substantial retreat
from past historical understandings of the third-party doctrine.  This Note
applies the new balancing test from Carpenter and finds that in its application,
the third-party doctrine no longer extends to the telephone metadata pro-
gram.  As such, this Note suggests that the government’s collection of tele-
phone metadata likely constitutes Fourth Amendment activity and opens up
the opportunity for the Supreme Court to rule on its constitutionality under
the Fourth Amendment.
A. Factor One: Individuals Have a Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
in the Metadata Collected by the Government Under
the Telephone Metadata Program
In applying Carpenter’s new third-party balancing test, courts will need to
take the same two steps as the Supreme Court did in determining whether a
reasonable or reduced expectation of privacy exists in the metadata collected
by the government under the telephone metadata program.  Much of the
analysis here will appear similar to the Court’s analysis in Carpenter.  Courts
will likely find a reasonable, rather than reduced, expectation of privacy in
the information collected under the telephone metadata program for the
following reasons.
124 United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 453 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
125 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967) (Douglas, J., concurring).
126 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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1. The Metadata Is Not Limited
The Court in Carpenter first examined the limitations on the information
available during the collection of CSLI data.127  Here, courts will likely find
that the telephone metadata program reveals nearly unlimited amounts of
information.  Especially given that the government can access originating
and terminating telephone numbers, as well as the time, location, and dura-
tion of the calls, much can be inferred from telephone metadata without
insight into the content of a call, “such as where people work and where
people live.”128  It is relatively simple to track the movements of an individual
using telephone metadata.129  For example, in one study, a team was able to
“uniquely pinpoint” the location information of ninety-five percent of their
subjects from merely four records of the location and time of each call.130
Information about the content of the call is unnecessary.131  The NSA could
then “cross-referenc[e]” this information with other data such as “credit card
transactions or e-mail communications” to reveal more information about an
individual.132  Such cross-referencing has the potential to “reveal sensitive
activity such as attendance at a particular church or a visit to an abortion
clinic.”133  This raises concerns similar to those that the Court expressed in
Carpenter—that the information could reveal the intimate details about an
individual’s life including “familial, political, professional, religious, and sex-
ual associations.”134  Similarly, courts will likely reach a similar conclusion
that there further lacks limitations on whose information is collected; the
Carpenter Court placed emphasis on the fact that the CSLI data “tracking
capacity r[an] against everyone.”135  As such, courts will most likely find that
the information collected under the telephone metadata program lacks limi-
tations, which will weigh in favor of individuals having a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy.
127 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018).
128 Jessica Leber, Mobile Call Logs Can Reveal a Lot to the NSA, MIT TECH. REV. (June 18,
2013), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/516181/mobile-call-logs-can-reveal-a-lot-to-
the-nsa/.  Leber further bolsters her point by arguing that because of “how much the NSA
could glean from call records,” it is misleading to downplay the significance of metadata
collection. Id.
129 See id. (discussing Vincent Blondel’s study in which his team analyzed fifteen
months of anonymous call records from 1.5 million people and could pinpoint movements
of ninety-five percent of people from only four records using the location and time of each
call).
130 Id.
131 See id. (Blondel stating in an interview that, “[y]ou can infer a lot, such as where
people work and where people live . . . [without] information about the content”).
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2217 (2018) (quoting United States v.
Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).
135 Id. at 2218.
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2. The Telephone Metadata Program Is Pervasive
Next, the Carpenter Court considered the pervasiveness of CSLI data col-
lection.  Here, courts will likely find that the telephone metadata program is
so pervasive as to implicate an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy
in the information that the government collects.  The pervasiveness is similar
to that which the Court found in Carpenter.136  Nearly indistinguishable from
the “detailed chronicle” of location information in Carpenter,137  the tele-
phone metadata also creates a detailed chronicle by collecting the time of
calls, the calls’ locations, and the calls’ durations.  As mentioned in the previ-
ous point, such insight into an individual’s communication can allow for the
government to understand a significant amount about an individual’s life.
Furthermore, the pervasiveness is retrospective, as the government collects
and maintains the information for five years.  This retrospective pervasive-
ness—as compared to CSLI data138—has an infallible memory, tracing and
recording every number dialed in and out, how long the call lasted, and from
or to where the call was made.  Therefore, the “detailed chronicle” of infor-
mation revealed by the bulk metadata program is also “compiled every day,
every moment, over several years.”139  As such, courts will most likely find
that the information collected under the telephone metadata program to be
especially pervasive, which weighs in favor of individuals having a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
B. Factor Two: There Is No Voluntary Exposure
In further applying Carpenter’s new third-party balancing test, courts
additionally will need to take the same two steps as the Supreme Court in
determining whether individuals voluntarily expose the metadata to the wire-
less carriers merely by using their services.  This analysis again mirrors the
Court’s analysis in Carpenter.  It is unlikely that courts will find voluntary
exposure for the following reasons.
1. The Metadata Is Not “Truly Shared” with Wireless Carriers
The Carpenter Court first considered whether the individual had a mean-
ingful choice in the recording of the metadata.140  When no choice existed,
the Court was reluctant to find that information was truly shared.141  Here,
courts will likely find no meaningful choice, and therefore, that the informa-
tion collected under the telephone metadata program is not truly shared.  In
Carpenter, the Court noted that cell phones are “indispensable to participa-
136 See id. at 2220.
137 Id.
138 See id. (emphasizing that this pervasiveness is especially concerning when it details
“a person’s physical presence compiled every day, every moment, over several years”).
139 Id.
140 See id.
141 See id.
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tion in modern society.”142  The same is true here.  Because the use of cell
phones is “indispensable,” the only way to avoid surveillance under the tele-
phone metadata program is to not use a cell phone.143  This is an impractical
solution, given that ninety-two percent of Americans own cell phones,144 and
that Americans also have an “intimate relationship” with them.145  Cell
phones have not only become commonplace, but a necessary staple to most
individuals.  Therefore, because cell phones are such a necessity in everyday
life to the point that their use is unavoidable, the information that they trans-
mit to wireless carriers cannot reasonably be considered “‘shared’ as one nor-
mally understands the term.”146  These considerations weigh against courts
finding voluntary exposure.
2. Individuals Do Not “Assume the Risk” Through an Affirmative Action
Finally, the Court in Carpenter evaluated whether individuals assumed
the risk of their CSLI data being collected and recorded.147  Here, courts will
most likely find that individuals do not assume the risk of their information
being recorded and stored under the telephone metadata program by some
affirmative act.  Under the telephone metadata program, any incoming or
outgoing call—arguably the primary purpose of a cell phone—would trigger
the recording of information.  Not only are incoming and outgoing calls the
primary purpose of a cell phone, but cell phones are becoming the only way
that Americans make and receive calls.  Studies show that 50.8% of American
households no longer have a landline telephone, but rather, at least one
member of the household owns a cell phone.148  Moreover, 50.5% of all
adults and 60.7% of all children live in homes that only have cell phones.149
142 Id.
143 In Carpenter, the Court already accepted this statement as true. See id. at 2218.
(“Only the few without cell phones could escape this tireless and absolute surveillance.”).
144 Monica Anderson, Technology Device Ownership: 2015, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 29, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/29/technology-device-ownership-2015/.
145 See Lesley Alderman, The Phones We Love Too Much, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2017), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/well/mind/the-phones-we-love-too-much.html (explain-
ing this intimate relationship by the fact that we sleep with, eat with, and always keep our
cell phones with us).  Alderman notes that Americans check their phones, on average
forty-seven times a day, and suggests that number might increase to eighty-two times a day
among younger populations. See id.  Americans’ attachment to their cell phones can be
explained by the fact that “[t]hey tell us the weather, the time of day and the steps we
[have] taken.  They find us dates (and sex), entertain us with music and connect us to
friends and family,” and “[t]hey answer our questions and quell feelings of loneliness and
anxiety.” Id.
146 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
147 See id. (“Second, a cell phone logs a cell-site record by dint of its operation, without
any affirmative act on the part of the user beyond powering up.”).
148 STEPHEN J. BLUMBERG & JULIAN V. LUKE, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, WIRE-
LESS SUBSTITUTION: EARLY RELEASE OF ESTIMATES FROM THE NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW
SURVEY, JULY–DECEMBER 2016, at 1 (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/early
release/wireless201705.pdf.
149 Id.
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Such information means that individuals do not alternate between a cell
phone and landline telephone usage; they do not borrow phones to make or
receive calls; they do not check their voicemail remotely or use pay phones.
Everything is being done from one central device: the cell phone.  Just like in
Carpenter, where the Court noted that “[v]irtually any activity on the phone
generates CSLI,” courts must recognize that any activity done on the phone
(and there are many of them) generates the information collected under the
telephone metadata program.150  Furthermore, similar to how the Court
noted that “[a]part from disconnecting the phone from the network, there is
no way to avoid leaving behind a trail of location data,” courts must account
for the fact that an individual could only turn off the phone in order prevent
metadata from being collected and recorded.151  The use of a cell phone,
which is an act so ingrained in Americans’ daily activities that it simply can-
not be thought of as an affirmative action, turns over a “comprehensive dos-
sier” of calls from which significant information can be inferred.152  This will
also weigh against the courts finding voluntary exposure.
C. Balancing the Factors
Justice Kennedy correctly described that the final step courts must take
involves a balancing test.  Courts must weigh “the privacy interests at stake . . .
against the fact that the information has been disclosed to a third party.”153
In doing so here, courts will likely find that: (1) individuals have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the information collected by the government under
the telephone metadata program; and (2) even though that information is
turned over to wireless carriers through the use of cell phones, it cannot
reasonably be said that individuals are making a voluntary exposure of such
information.  Therefore, the privacy interests at stake clearly outweigh the
mere fact that information has been disclosed to the wireless carriers.  Courts
must then find that Miller and Smith no longer control such cases and that
the telephone metadata program constitutes Fourth Amendment activity.
Courts will finally be able to answer the question of whether the government
violates individuals’ Fourth Amendment rights.
D. Implications of the Balancing Test Findings
The fact that the third-party doctrine most likely no longer extends to
the telephone metadata program does not automatically mean that the gov-
ernment’s collection of metadata is unconstitutional.  Rather, it means that
individuals can now bring constitutional challenges to the government’s war-
rantless searches under FISA because those individuals will no longer lack
150 Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2220.
151 Id.
152 This is like the “comprehensive dossier” of location information, which CSLI data
reveals. Id.
153 Id. at 2231(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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standing.154  From this point, courts will consider whether the warrantless
search was supported by probable cause that the individual was engaged in
criminal activity that constituted a national security threat.155  This further
testing by the courts will require a more fact-specific inquiry.
Due to the lack of transparency surrounding the current collection of
telephone metadata under FISA, it is difficult to know what query terms the
government uses, on what grounds they query, and how many individuals
they reach under a suspicion of a single person.156  These factors will all hold
significant weight with courts as they decide whether the government had
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search.  Moreover, if the laws change
again and Congress enacts a bill with a provision similar to section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act, the government could easily return to unlimited warrantless
searching.157  Some of those searches may be justified, while others most cer-
tainly will not.  The uncertainly and lack of transparency makes any kind of
prediction of how the courts will rule far too speculative.  One thing, how-
ever, remains clear under the application of Carpenter’s new balancing test to
the telephone metadata program: the courts will give us an answer on the
constitutionality of bulk metadata collection very soon.
CONCLUSION
The new balancing test introduced by the Court in Carpenter v. United
States158 marks a substantial retreat from our traditional understanding of the
Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States,159 and our understanding of the
154 The Court in Carpenter explains this, noting that “[h]aving found that the acquisi-
tion of Carpenter’s CSLI was a search,” it could now go on to test the search’s constitution-
ality under the Fourth Amendment and “conclude that the Government must generally
obtain a warrant supported by probable cause before acquiring such records.” Id. at 2221
(majority opinion).  This comes from the Court’s original understanding of testing the
constitutionality of the government’s action under the Fourth Amendment in Katz.  Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  In order to find a violation of the Fourth Amendment,
the Court required, first, that the government’s actions constituted a search or seizure,
which is what this Note has referred to as “Fourth Amendment activity.” Id. at 353 (“The
Government’s activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words
violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and
thus constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
After finding Fourth Amendment activity, “[t]he question remaining for decision, then, is
whether the search and seizure conducted in th[e] case complied with constitutional stan-
dards.” Id. at 354.
155 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 (requiring a probable cause justification).
156 See Vincent, supra note 120 (noting that millions of records continue to be dispro-
portionately collected by the government with respect to the number of warrants granted,
without explanation).
157 See United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272,
287–88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1861–1863 (2012)).
158 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
159 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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third-party doctrine in United States v. Miller160 and Smith v. Maryland.161  It
addresses Justice Sotomayor’s concerns about the third-party doctrine’s place
in a modernizing digital world, as she explained in her concurrence in United
States v. Jones.162  And it returns to the question prompted by Justice Douglas
in his dissent in Katz of how we handle abuses of Fourth Amendment juris-
prudence that are masked as national security concerns.163
The third-party doctrine is no longer guided by a bright-line rule.
Courts must now balance whether there is a reasonable or reduced expecta-
tion of privacy in information against whether that information is truly
shared.  Despite Chief Justice Roberts’s protests that Carpenter was a narrow
holding, the new balancing test has serious implications that reach issues
within national security law.  Specifically, the new balancing test would apply
to the telephone metadata program as it applied to the collection of CSLI
data.  Under the telephone metadata program, the government collected
bulk telephone metadata from millions of American wireless users, an action
previously defensible simply because Americans turn over that information to
their wireless carriers.  The implications of the FREEDOM Act on this behav-
ior is unclear, as it effectively ended bulk collection under section 215 of the
PATRIOT Act.  But significant collection still occurs, transparency on the
matter is limited, and the number of data points collected far exceeds the
number of warrants granted.  Even with the government’s assertion that data
collection will come to an end, the true problem lies in that the Supreme
Court has never ruled that bulk metadata collection violates the Fourth
Amendment.  In light of Carpenter, that question now has the opportunity to
be considered.
When that question reaches the Supreme Court, the Justices will likely
find that the third-party doctrine does not bar a Fourth Amendment claim
because the third-party doctrine will no longer apply.  First, the Court will
most likely find that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the metadata collected by the government under the telephone metadata
program.  This is (1) because the metadata is not limited, as it reveals nearly
unlimited information that can be inferred without the content of the calls;
and (2) because the telephone metadata program is pervasive, as it provides
retrospective insight to the past five years of an individual’s life.  Second, the
Court will most likely find that there is no voluntary exposure.  There is no
voluntary exposure because the metadata is not truly shared with wireless
carriers as cell phones have a necessary and common place in everyday life
and because individuals do not assume the risk through an affirmative action,
as they need do nothing more than simply start up their phone in order to
160 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
161 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
162 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
163 Katz, 389 U.S. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring) (viewing the Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence at the time as giving a “wholly unwarranted green light for the Executive
Branch to resort to electronic eavesdropping without a warrant in cases which the Execu-
tive Brach itself labels ‘national security’ matters”).
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trigger the sharing of information.  The reasonable expectation of privacy in
the telephone metadata is buttressed by the fact that there is no voluntary
exposure of the information.  With the determination that the bulk metadata
collection constitutes Fourth Amendment activity and the telephone
metadata is entitled to Fourth Amendment protection, courts can finally
answer the question of whether the government’s collection of such informa-
tion violates the Fourth Amendment—a question that will surely reach the
Supreme Court in the near future.
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